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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April 17, 1991, Appellant, Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Macris"), filed 
suit against Images and Attitude, Inc. ("Images"), alleging that Images had breached its 
distributorship agreement with Macris (^'Macris F). See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Neways, Inc., 2002 UT App 406, ^ 2, 60 P.3d 1176.1 (R. 192-203.) 
2. On September 1, 1992, almost three years before the trial of Macris I, 
Images sold some of its assets to Neways. Id. (R. 350-352.) 
3. On February 14, 1995, before any judgment had been entered against 
Images, and almost three years after Images sold certain assets to Neways, Macris filed 
this action against Neways and the Mowers, alleging "that the transfer of assets from 
Images to Neways left Images without sufficient assets to cover any judgment rendered 
against it in Macris F ("Macris IF). Id at Tf 3. (R. 1-12.) Macris alleged that Neways 
and the Mowers were liable to Macris on theories of fraudulent transfer, alter ego, and 
1
 The claims in this action and in Macris I are the subject of four previous 
appellate court opinions. Neways will cite to the opinions, as well as the appellate 
record, as support for certain background facts and procedural history. Macris & Assocs., 
Inc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Macris & Assocs., 
Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 1999 UT App 406, 986 P.2d 748; Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, 
Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214; and Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2002 UT 
App 406, 60 P.3d 1176. 
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successor liability Id, Mac us also M»i]ti"Jn i mi iun damages, based on the distributorship 
agree nit ill ;i! J,VUK. in Macris J, that wei e not awarded in Macris I. (Id.) 
4. Two days later, on February 16, 1995, the bench trial in Macris 1 begai *" \ t 
the conclusion of the *, . •, the district couri dnenmnul ili;il In \\yr*< Irnl materially 
breached its c< . * ' r "'00? III App 406, U 4. Images stipulated that it owed 
Maciis $360,681.20 in contract damages. (R. 959 N Tie judgment against Images was 
entered on or about September H. : (the 'Images juclj.jiinif i' 11- (| ( l l i I i 
5. 1 ;^ ~ '•' - apparently caused writs of garnishment to be 
issued and served on Neways and its counsel. Neways responded that it was not holding 
any monies due and owing to Images. 00-908.) 
6. ( . • " J iui summar ' judgment in Macris 11, 
asserting that Macris's claims were barred by res judicata. Id. 
7. Macris cross-moved for summary judgment on :;* .:-:;* Micu'ssor 
liability h 
8. On January 22, 1996, the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment 
came on for hearing before the Honorable Howard Maetani in ir-puiiM' H^ \\ i MK WMMJLJ 
by the Court h, ,_ . > 4.suibS counsel stated as follows: 
On June 19, 1997, this Court affirmed the Images Judgment. See Macris & 
Assocs.,lnc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), 
UT-DOCS_,A# !/>.«. «i 2 
MR. KARRENBERG: 
That's why I would do the same thing. I wouldn't add 
the third corporation, your Honor, because one, the fraudulem 
transfer action to the third corporation requires I first get a 
judgment from this Court that can't be collected somewhere. 
I mean, if I can collect this other judgment against Images, 
the fraudulent transfer goes away by its [own] sake. I can 
only collect my judgments [once], correct? You know what I 
mean? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. KARRENBERG: If I go out and find Images has 
some — if we come in here and by the time we go to trial I've 
collected. I find Images had some assets, and I've collected 
the full judgment for the first breach of Judge Burningham, 
the fraudulent transfer is gone. By nature it doesn't 
matter. I've collected my judgment. They can fraudulent 
transfer all they want. I haven't been damaged by the 
fraudulent transfer. 
(R. 507 at 40-41; emphasis added.) 
9. On November 13, 1997, the district court ruled that Neways, as Images's 
successor, was responsible to pay the Images Judgment awarded to Macris and that res 
judicata barred all of Macris's other claims for damages against Neways. (R. 467.) 
10. Based on the district court's ruling, Macris caused two writs of garnishment 
to be issued and served on Zions Bank and First Interstate Bank, respectively, on or about 
November 19, 1997. First Interstate Bank responded that it held approximately $11,100 
owing to Neways. Zions Bank responded that it had $568,714 in Neways's funds. (R. 
890-898.) 
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11. Later, Neways postt •. - ; "M 
and the garnished funds were released. (R. 491.) 
12. Both Neways and Macris appealed the district court's order granting 
summary judgment. Specifically, Neways sought to reverse the court's ruling that 
Neways was responsible for the Images Judgment based on successor liability. On the 
other hand, Macris challenged the court's ruling that res judicata precluded the award of 
any additional contract damages. (R. 460, 490.) 
13. On July 22, 1999, this Court issued an opinion reversing the district court's 
order of summary judgment on both grounds, concluding that Macris's claims were not 
barred by res judicata and that disputed issues of fact existed regarding the issue of 
successor liability. See Macris & Assocs., Inc., v. Neways, Inc., 1999 UT App 230, \ i7, 
986 748. (R. 523.) 
14. Neways and the Mowers, but not Macris, sought a ^ i;; • . certiorari, w: .h 
the Utah Supreme Court granted. (R. 539.) On December 5, 2( • e cuun 
affirmed this Court's determination ti.ai Macris's claims of alter ego, fraudulent 
conveyance, and successor liability were not barred by res judicata. The supreme court 
further concluded, however, that issue preclusion barred Macris from seeking additional 
contract damages against Neways and the Mowers/thus limiting Macris's claims against 
defendants solely to the Images Judgment, if Macris could prove its claims. See Macris 
& Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, lnc.,2( ' 
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15. For the very first time, on February 1, 2001, Maoris's new counsel, Paul C. 
Droz, wrote a letter to Wade Winegar, as "counsel of record for Images & Attitude, Inc.," 
demanding that "Images & Attitude, Inc satisfy the enclosed Judgment entered in this 
case on September 14, 1995." (R. 889.) (A true and correct copy of the letter is attached 
as Exhibit "A.") 
16. Just over two weeks later, on February 16, 2001, the Images Judgment was 
paid in full, including interest, in the amount of $746,356.97. (R. 887.) 
17. On April 12, 2001, Macris filed a Satisfaction of Judgment. (R. 885.) 
18. Following satisfaction of the Images Judgment, Neways and the Mowers 
again moved for summary judgment in Macris II, arguing that Macris II was moot 
because the Images Judgment had been paid and that, under the Utah Supreme Court's 
opinion, Macris was barred from seeking further contract damages. (R. 626.) 
19. In response, Macris asserted, for the first time, that the action was not moot 
because the attorneys' fees incurred in Macris //were recoverable as consequential 
damages against Images under the third-party litigation exception. (R. 645-650.) 
20. On August 2, 2001, the district court granted the motion for summary 
judgment filed by Neways and the Mowers, concluding that Macris's claims for 
fraudulent transfer, alter ego, and successor liability became moot once the Images 
Judgment was paid. (R. 736-745.) 
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21 . Macris appealed tJJi diMmi n mir l \ uuln j:i.'niiir J | ' M J I J i i i h i ! \ j u t l ; II Jt III mi I i 
Ntv.^ys iiin1 11 " 'Mowers 
22. This Court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment, 
holding that Macris could recover attorneys' fees as consequential damages, under the 
consequence of Images's breach and that it was necessary to bring the action." Macris & 
Assocs.f Inc. v. Newqys, Inc., 2002 UT App 406, \ 22, 60 P.3d 1176. «K 67- i.) 
23. 1 
attorneys' fees, "such fees are limited to those incurred before the contract claim 
against Images was satisfied," i.e., February 16, 2001. Id at.^ f 23 (emphasis added). 
• 2 4 . T 1 1 * t ""t'H'l l i i r ih i i «> h i l u ) l h ; i | Mini v 11 Li I'»n H 1 m m l n n j ' r s m i l s l lms i* 
dan lages incuncu * in litigation with a thii d part)7 to recover its contract damages [from 
Macris I\" Id. (emphasis added). 
25. After this Court, remanded tl le case tc tl le disti ict cc i n L, } Jew ays ai id tl i z 
Jvlcm ( rs served Requests for Production of Documents on Macris. 
26. On or about June 4, 2003, in response to the document requests, Macris 
admitted that the February 1, 200L dei :i lai id lettei I i: • : i :t i ] Il i Di oz was tl ic f ii st i ;i id :)iily 
tii i ic I Iaci is 1 lad evei demanded that In lages pay the Images Judgment. (R. 881-882.) (A 
true and correct copy of Macris's response to the Requests for Production of Documents 
is attached as Exhibit "B.") 
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27. On March 1, 2004, the district court entered an order (1) denying Macris's 
motion to compel the production of certain discovery from Neways and the Mowers and 
(2) bifurcating Macris's claims in this action. The district court ordered as follows: 
The Court hereby bifurcates the issue of whether Macris II 
was a natural consequence of Images' breach and, therefore, 
necessary to obtain satisfaction of judgment, and this issue 
shall be tried before other issues, if any, in this case. 
(R. 867-869.) 
28. On November 1, 2004, the district court entered an order granting the 
motion for summary judgment filed by Neways and the Mowers, determining that Macris 
had failed to produce evidence "to prove that this action was a natural consequence of the 
alleged fraudulent transfer by Images & Attitude, Inc. and that it was necessary to file 
this action." (R. 1070.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As the district court aptly stated, "this action is far too old, and should be 
resolved." (R. 859.) Once again, however, Macris appeals the district court's ruling, 
arguing that the court erred in limiting the scope of discovery and in bifurcating the issue 
of whether this lawsuit was a "necessary" consequence of Images' alleged actions. 
Properly exercising its broad discretion in discovery matters, the district court concluded 
that Macris's discovery requests exceeded the narrow issue before the court, i.e., whether 
this action was necessary. The district court committed no error of law and did not base 
its decision on a lack of evidence. Accordingly, the order was proper. 
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• . E v e n i f llii:*'I nu l l m i l m dt k m m i t IfuiMhi d i s m u i N H H I H \s , r , mi .T io i M i i u r 
y (Tf'i i tl Kf 11 u ii i mi because of the court's ruling. The district court ultimately granted 
summary judgment to Neways and the Mowers because Macris failed to produce any 
evidence showing that this action was necessary, 11 is undisjnih <l dial In;loir I < hruai v 
?IH) I Mat! iv tinv? drnifiTidcd thai the Images Judgment be satisfied. Also, the record 
reflects that Macris had evidence that it previously obtained in this action and in Macris I 
that could possibly have been used in an attempt to create a factual issue on summary 
j u d g m e n i M a t i n . I i i iw ive i f .n ln l to pit n nf an > nf i t ir < \ i d c n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , a n y 
error in the district court's discovery order was harmless. 
Macris erroneously argues that Neways and the Mowers were required to come 
forward \ equential 
damages. To the contrary, Neways and the Mowers met their initial burden by showing 
that there was a lack of evidence to support an essential element < I Macris s claim on 
w h i c h it h a d l lu I ' l i i i k n n i p i o o l tli.il (llmr ;it l ion v ii«- t i n r s s a n M M I ,JS «,t;f ( nid \\ <><
 i 
Macris failed to avail itself of the evidence in the record in an attempt to create a factual 
issue on summary judgment. Thus, the district court properly entered summary judgment 
in favor ol Nt \ S J S w i n d ilu M o i u i . s , A" < n i d i n j ' h 'hi> i imri l | n n | d n i r m tin i l ^ H u t 
« , mi,ui>, i )i de r s and bring this t e n - y e a r - o l d c a s e to a c l o s e . 
IT l \ 2 8 
ARGUMENT 
I. MACRIS HAS FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO 
BIFURCATE AND IN DENYING THE MOTION TO COMPEL. 
On March 1, 2004, the district court entered an order stating as follows: 
The Court hereby bifurcates the issue of 
whether Macris II was a natural consequence of the 
Images breach and, therefore, necessary to obtain 
satisfaction of judgment, and this issue shall be tried 
before other issues, if any, in this case. 
(R. 867-869.) Macris argues that the district court erred when it (1) bifurcated the issue 
of whether Macris II "was a natural consequence o f Images's alleged conduct and (2) 
denied Macris's motion to compel discovery.3 A district court has "broad latitude in 
handling discovery matters." R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 
1068, 1079 (Utah 1997). "An appellate court will not find abuse of discretion absent an 
erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court to 
rule on." Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996). Also, in deciding 
discovery matters, the district court may "decide controverted factual issues," "draw 
inferences where conflicting inferences are possible," and "weigh competing interests." 
Id. (citation omitted). "The propriety of an interrogatory or other discovery is primarily 
for the trial court to determine." State Road Comm 'n v. Petty, 412 P.2d 914, 918 (Utah 
3
 As this Court previously noted, Macris does not have a direct claim against 
Neways or the Mowers under the third-party litigation exception. Macris & Assocs., 
2002UTApp,406,Tfl9. 
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1966). 'The district court is in an advantaged position in proximity to all aspects of the 
lawsuit," and it is therefore "practical and desirable that he be allowed considerable 
latitude of discretion in his rulings thereon." Id. Because Macris has failed to meet its 
burden to show that the district court made any erroneous conclusion of law, or that there 
was no evidentiary basis for the ruling, the order denying the motion to compel should be 
affirmed. 
A. The District Court Did Not Make Any Errors of Law or Base Its 
Decision On a Lack of Evidence, 
"The district court is entrusted with broad discretion in dealing with discovery 
matters, [including] protective orders." In re Discipline of Pendleton, 2000 UT 77, ^  38, 
11 P.3d 284. Under Rule 26(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court 
has discretion to limit the use of discovery if "the discovery is unduly burdensome or 
expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
limitations on the parties' resources and the importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation." Also, the court may enter a protective order requiring 'that certain matters 
not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(c)(4). Finally, bifurcation is an issue within the sound discretion of 
the district court. See Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30, If 5, 996 P.2d 565. 
In its brief, Macris argues that the district court concluded that Macris must "make 
a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief before being permitted to conduct 
discovery." (Brief of Appellant ["Applnt. Br."] at 8; emphasis in original.) Macris, 
UT DOCS A #1173440 v2 10 
however, points to no record citation showing that the district court made such a 
determination. In fact, by failing to request the transcript of the district court's hearing 
on the motion to compel, Macris has failed to ensure an adequate record on appeal. In 
the absence of a transcript, this Court will "assume the regularity of the proceedings 
below." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,1J11, 12 P.3d 92 (citation omitted). 
In any event, the district court properly denied the motion to compel because 
Macris's discovery requests did not address the issue of whether this action had to be 
filed in February 1995 as a result of Images's alleged wrongful conduct.4 For instance, in 
its interrogatories, Macris inquired about "the total value of the assets owned by Neways, 
Inc. as of August 30, 1992." (R. 827.) Also, Macris asked about the assets of Images as 
of August 30, 1992, that were not acquired by Neways in August 1992. (Id.) The district 
court exercised its discretion to limit inquiry into these matters because they did not 
directly address the narrow issue on remand: whether it was necessary for Macris to file 
this action in February 1995 because of Images's alleged wrongful conduct. The district 
court concluded that, based on the limited scope of issues on remand and on Macris's 
undisputed failure to make a demand for payment on Images until February 2001, 
Macris's discovery requests went too far afield and did not bear on whether the action 
4
 At the time this action was filed, the trial in Macris I had not yet begun. Thus, 
this action was not necessary at the time it was filed because Macris did not yet have a 
judgment against Images. (Statement of Facts, ^ 3.) 
UT DOCS A #1173440 v2 11 
was necessary. (R. 853.) Thus, Macris has failed to show that the district court 
committed error. See Askew, 918 P.2d at 472. 
To prove that this action was necessary, Macris was required to establish that 
Images's alleged wrongful conduct was the proximate cause of this lawsuit. See South 
Sandpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Utah 1988) (stating that fees are not 
recoverable "on causes of action not proximately necessitated by that defendant's 
negligence"). The necessity of filing this action cannot be proven merely by showing 
that Images had little or no assets in August 1992, over three years before the Images 
Judgment was entered. Indeed, even if Macris could prove that Images fraudulently 
transferred its assets, that fact alone would not establish that this action was "necessary," 
particularly because Macris never demanded payment of the Images Judgment until 
February 2001. See Sanner v. Poll, 298 B.R. 557, 564 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) (stating 
that even though party had breached real estate purchase contract, that breach did not 
cause any litigation with a third party). The question of whether the "party sought to be 
charged with the fees was guilty of a wrongful or negligent act" is a separate issue from 
whether the third-party litigation was "the natural and necessary consequence[] of the 
defendant's act, since remote, uncertain, and contingent consequences do not afford a 
basis for recovery." Uyemura v. Wick, 551 P.2d 171, 176 (Haw. 1976). Thus, Macris 
must still prove the element of "causation" to recover attorneys' fees as consequential 
damages. Pack, 765 P.2d at 1283. 
UT DOCS.A #1173440 v2 12 
In its unique position, the district court was aware of the long procedural history of 
this action and what had been done to move the case forward. (R. 859.) TTie district 
court was aware that if Macris had intended to recover attorneys' fees when it filed this 
action, Macris should have made efforts early in the case to establish that this action was 
necessary, such as by requiring Images to appear in a supplemental proceeding to testify 
regarding its assets.5 Based on these factors, the district court exercised its broad 
discretion to bifurcate the case and limit the scope of discovery to the issue of whether 
this action was proximately caused, and made "necessary," by Images's alleged wrongful 
conduct. See id The district court's discovery order was not based on an erroneous view 
of the law or on a lack of evidence. Thus, the discovery order should be affirmed. See 
Askew, 91* P.2d at 472. 
B. Macris Suffered No Prejudice By the Court's Ruling. 
Even if this Court were to determine that the district court committed some error 
in its discovery order, the district court's denial of the motion to compel was harmless. 
An error is "harmless" if there is "no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796-97 (Utah 
1991). As set forth more fully below, the district court's ultimate decision to dismiss this 
case was supported by Macris's failure to have demanded payment of the Images 
5
 Indeed, this Court pointed out that Macris did not ask for attorneys' fees in its 
Complaint against Neways. 2002 UT App 406, H 8, n.7. 
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Judgment until February 2001, well after this action was filed. Moreover, Macris failed 
to avail itself of post-judgment remedies against Images that would have been beneficial 
in determining Images's willingness and ability to pay the Images Judgment in 
September 1995. As stated in Leslie D. Mower's Affidavit dated November 21, 1995, 
"Neways did not purchase all the assets of Images." (R. 352.) After obtaining the 
Images Judgment, however, Macris never sought an order in supplemental proceedings 
requiring Images to appear and testify about the assets that it had at that time. See Utah 
R. Civ. P. 69(o). Instead, Macris served writs of garnishment on Neways in an attempt to 
garnish Images's funds allegedly held by Neways. Macris never attempted to garnish any 
of Images's bank accounts. Thus, no amount of discovery could have cured Macris's 
prior failure to investigate Images's ability to satisfy the Images Judgment from 
September 1995, when the Images Judgment was entered, until February 2001, when the 
Images Judgment was paid within fifteen days after demand. 
In addition, in as early as 1995, Macris had already conducted discovery in this 
action regarding the alleged sale of Images's assets.6 On August 28, 1995, counsel for 
Macris took the deposition of Richard L. Halliday, in which the deponent was asked 
about the transfer of assets to Neways, among other topics. (R. 241.) In addition, Tom 
6
 Macris had the opportunity to conduct discovery in this action from February 
1995 to February 1996, when the district court stayed the case pending the appeal in 
Macris L Also, there were several months in 1997 and in 2001, when the district court 
had jurisdiction over this case, when Macris could have conducted discovery. 
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Mower stated in an Affidavit that he had been deposed in Macris I on the topics of 
"Neways, its creation, and the sale of Images assets to Neways." (R. 231.) Thus, Macris 
already had evidence potentially relating to the alleged fraudulent transfer that it could 
have used in an attempt to defeat Neways's motion for summary judgment.7 Ultimately, 
Macris failed to marshal the available evidence in an attempt to create a factual issue to 
prevent summary judgment. Thus, any error of the district court in its interlocutory order 
denying the motion to compel was harmless.8 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF NEWAYS AND THE MOWERS. 
Macris argues that, in considering Neways's motion for summary judgment, the 
district court erroneously required Macris to come forward with evidence to support its 
In noting that Macris may already have had evidence that it could have 
produced in response to the motion for summary judgment, Neways and the Mowers do 
not concede that such evidence would have been sufficient to create a factual issue. 
Rather, Neways and the Mowers refer to these record citations to show that Macris 
apparently had some evidence that may have related to its fraudulent-transfer claim. It 
was Macris's burden to present that evidence to the district court in response to the 
motion for summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). Macris failed to do so, 
however, and summary judgment was properly entered. Id. 
8
 Macris erroneously argues that a "court's error in failing to require discovery is 
presumed to have been prejudicial and mandates reversal." In Askew v. Hardman, 884 
P.2d 1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), rev'don other grounds, 918 P.2d 469 (Utah 1996), this 
Court stated that the burden is on the party resisting discovery to prove that an error was 
harmless. This Court never stated, however, that reversal is mandated in such 
circumstances. In Askew, the defendant had "not demonstrated that the denial of 
Plaintiffs discovery request was not prejudicial." Id. at 1263. By contrast, Neways has 
met its burden to present sufficient evidence to show that any error committed by the 
district court in denying the motion to compel was harmless. 
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claim that this action was necessary. Macris argues that "defendants offered no evidence 
that the Images judgment would have been paid without the need for the Neways 
litigation." (Applnt. Br. at 13.) Macris's arguments turn the evidentiary burden of proof 
on its head. Neways did not have the burden to show that the Images Judgment 'Svould 
have been paid" even if this action had not been filed. Rather, as the party seeking 
attorneys' fees as consequential damages for Images's alleged wrongful conduct, Macris 
had the burden to prove that this action was necessary. Macris & Assocs., 2002 UT App 
406, ^ 22 (stating that, to recover under the third-party litigation exception, Macris must 
prove the elements of the exception); see also Lovett v. Estate ofLovett, 593 A.2d 382, 
389 (N.J. Super. 1991) (noting that it is "plaintiffs burden" to prove causation under the 
third-party litigation exception). 
A. Neways and the Mowers Were Not Required to Produce Affirmative 
Evidence to Negate Macris's Claims, 
In its brief, Macris relies heavily on Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), 
for the proposition that, to defeat summary judgment, Macris was not required to produce 
any evidence to support its claims. The proper scope of the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Adickes was discussed in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S. 317 (1986). 
There, the Supreme Court determined that there is "no express or implied requirement in 
Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials 
negating the opponent's claim." Id. at 322. The Court clarified that Adickes should not 
be "construed to mean that the burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to 
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produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with 
respect to an issue on which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof." Id. at 325. 
Instead, the Court stated that the "burden on the moving party may be discharged by 
'showing5 - that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence 
to support the non-moving party's case." Id. The Court emphasized that one of the 
principal purposes of Rule 56 "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or 
defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this 
purpose." Id. at 323; see also Reagan Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 
779 (Utah 1984) (stating that a major purpose of summary judgment is "to avoid 
unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether 
there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder"). 
In Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this Court cited 
Celotex Corp. with approval and quoted language from the opinion stating that a moving 
party is entitled to summary judgment when the non-moving party "has failed to make a 
sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the 
burden of proof." Id. at 1391 (emphasis added; citation omitted). In Schafir, this Court 
noted that the plaintiff had the burden of proof to establish that the defendant had 
knowledge of certain plumbing problems. Because the plaintiff failed to produce 
evidence to support an element of the claim on which the plaintiff had the burden of 
proof, summary judgment was properly granted. Id. 
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In this case, the district court properly followed the standards set forth in Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, as adopted by this Court. At the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment filed by Neways and the Mowers, counsel for Macris argued that 
[w]here we have to carry our burden is at trial, and the 
way that will be done at trial is we will put on the two people 
who owned Images and Attitudes in 1992, the Mowers, and ask 
them whether they had any assets. They will either take the fifth, 
from which the adverse inference can be drawn, or they'll admit 
that there were no assets in Images and Attitudes. 
(Transcript of Hearing, September 21, 2004, at 16.) In its ruling, the district court stated 
as follows: 
I agree with the proposition that Macris can't simply sit back 
and say, "Wait until we get to trial. We'll show you everything." 
The case has reached - this case, in its uniqueness, has reached the 
posture of a time to demonstrate the inability to pay, rather than 
relying upon what may be done in the future. 
Mr. Eckersley, you are absolutely correct that there is a 
burden of proof on the party moving for this kind of relief, but the 
rules also, as they have been modified now, say that once this ruling 
is requested, and once a reasonable legitimate application of law and 
the facts are made to the Court, then the responding party has the 
responsibility to come forth with sufficient information to 
demonstrate that those scales do not weigh in favor of the moving 
party anymore, and they stay on your side. 
(Id. at 19.) Thus, the district court properly rejected Macris's attempt to place on Neways 
and the Mowers the burden of proof on an essential element of Macris's claim for 
consequential damages, i.e., showing that this action was necessary. See Schafir, 879 
P.2dat 1391. 
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B. Macris Failed to Rely on Available Evidence in an Attempt to Create 
an Issue of Fact 
In response to the motion for summary judgment, Macris expressly stated that it 
did "not dispute the factual statements offered by defendants." (R. 1052.) Accordingly, 
pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the statement of 
undisputed and material facts in the supporting memorandum filed by Neways and the 
Mowers was deemed admitted. (R. 1070.) In addition, Macris did not file a motion 
under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure asking for more time to conduct 
discovery in the case. Instead, in its written response to the motion for summary 
judgment, Macris argued that the "necessity of the present action is established by the 
allegations of the complaint (which are unrebuted by any evidence) that Images had no 
assets from which it could satisfy the Macris' claim (either before or after it was reduced 
to judgment) following its September 1, 1992, fraudulent transfer to Neways." (R. 1047.) 
Thus, at its own peril, Macris rested almost exclusively on its pleadings to oppose the 
motion for summary judgment. See Celotex, 411 U.S. at 325. 
The only evidence that Macris offered in opposition to Neways's motion was an 
unauthenticated copy of the Asset Purchase Agreement.9 Macris presented no testimony 
showing the financial condition of Images at any point in time between September 1995 
9
 To avoid authenticity issues, Macris could have relied on the Affidavit of 
Leslie D. Mower, dated November 21, 1995, which attached a copy of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement. That affidavit however, states unequivocally that Images did not transfer all 
its assets to Neways. 
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through February 2001. Nor did Macris dispute that it took no formal steps, such as 
obtaining an order in supplemental proceedings, to discover what assets Images had when 
the Images Judgment was entered in September 1995. Also, Macris did not dispute that it 
never demanded payment of the Images Judgment until February 2001. Summary 
judgment was appropriate because, as a matter of law, Macris failed to produce evidence 
supporting an essential element of its claim, i.e., that the filing of this action was a 
"natural consequence" of Images's alleged wrongful conduct and that this action was 
"necessary."10 
As stated previously, there is evidence in the record that Macris potentially could 
have offered in response to the motion for summary judgment in an attempt to create a 
factual issue. For instance, in August 1995, Macris took the deposition of Richard L. 
Halliday. The portion of the transcript of Mr. Halliday's deposition appearing in the 
record reflects that Macris's attorney asked questions about the creation of Neways. (R. 
241.) In addition, Tom Mower was deposed in Macris 1 regarding fraudulent-transfer 
issues, and Macris could have attached portions of his deposition transcript to its 
memorandum opposing the motion for summary judgment. (R. 231.) Macris simply 
failed to marshal any of the available evidence in an attempt to create an issue of fact that 
would preclude summary judgment. 
10
 Because the Utah Supreme Court ruled that Macris was not entitled to 
additional contract damages in this action, that portion of the complaint was not 
"necessary" on those grounds alone. See 2000 UT 93, U 47. 
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Instead, Macris chose to argue that Neways had the burden to produce evidence 
that Images 'Svould have" satisfied the judgment in 1995, a burden that Neways and the 
Mowers were not required to shoulder. Thus, Macris failed to offer evidence that the 
filing of this action was "a direct and necessary consequence o f Images's alleged 
fraudulent transfer. Hitachi Credit America Corp. v. Signet Bank, 166 F.3cl 614, 632 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs expenditures in third-party litigation were not caused 
by Signet's breach of contract, and were not a direct and necessary consequence of such 
breach of contract); see also Lovett v. Estate ofLovett, 593 A.2d 382, 389 (N.J. Super. 
1991) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to attorneys' fees because he failed to meet 
"his burden to prove that the fees were either reasonably necessary or caused by any 
wrong doing" by the alleged tortfeasor). 
C. Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted Because Macris Failed to 
Demand Payment of the Images Judgment Before February 2001, 
On February 1, 2001, Macris's counsel wrote a letter to counsel for Images 
demanding payment of the Images Judgment. (R. 889.) Just over two weeks later, on 
February 16, 2001, the Images Judgment was paid in full, including interest (See 
Statement of Facts, f^lj 16-17.) Because Macris never demanded that Images pay the 
Images Judgment until February 2001, the parties cannot know whether the Images 
Judgment would have been satisfied and whether this action truly was necessary. 
Indeed, it appears that Macris's claim for attorneys' fees as consequential damages 
was an after-thought that it raised only in response to Neways's motion for summary 
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judgment, long after this case had been filed. This is best demonstrated in a statement 
given by Macris's counsel at the hearing, held on January 26, 1996, on the parties' first 
cross-motions for summary judgment. In that statement, counsel acknowledged that if 
the judgment were paid, Macris would have no fraudulent transfer claim: 
MR. KARRENBERG: .... 
That's why I would do the same thing. I wouldn't add 
the third corporation, your Honor, because one, the fraudulent 
transfer action to the third corporation requires I first get a 
judgment from this Court that can't be collected somewhere. 
I mean, if I can collect this other judgment against Images, 
the fraudulent transfer goes away by its [own] sake. I can 
only collect my judgments [once], correct? You know what I 
mean? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. KARRENBERG: If I go out and find Images has 
some — if we come in here and by the time we go to trial I've 
collected. I find Images had some assets, and I've collected 
the full judgment for the first breach of Judge Burningham, 
the fraudulent transfer is gone. By nature it doesn't 
matter. I've collected my judgment. They can fraudulent 
transfer all they want. I haven't been damaged by the 
fraudulent transfer. 
(R. 507 at 40-41; emphasis added.)11 Thus, early in this case, Macris acknowledged that 
if it could collect the Images Judgment, it would have no damages. Despite that 
knowledge, Macris waited until February 2001 to demand payment of the Images 
The same logic applies to Macris's claims for successor liability and alter ego. 
Once the Images Judgment was satisfied, those claims became moot. 
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Judgment or otherwise attempt to discover what assets Images may have had to satisfy 
the Images Judgment. 
Macris cannot now, at this stage, reconstruct the past in a post-hoc attempt to 
prove the necessity of the action. Macris had the burden to prove it was entitled to 
attorneys' fees under the third-party litigation exception. Thus, it is Macris, not Neways 
and the Mowers, that should bear the consequences of its own failure to demand payment 
of the Images Judgment, or otherwise investigate Images's assets, before February 2001. 
D. The District Court Did Not Improperly Weigh Competing Inferences. 
Finally, Macris argues that summary judgment was improper because the evidence 
before the district court was "susceptible to two different inferences." (Applnt. Br. at 15.) 
Although Macris relies on West v. Thomson Newspapers, 835 P.2d 179 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), to support its arguments, that opinion was expressly vacated by the Utah Supreme 
Court in West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1020 (Utah 1994). Macris also 
cites Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002UT 21, 44 P.3d 704, for the proposition that the district 
court may not draw fact inferences on a motion for summary judgment. Only two 
justices, however, joined in the portion of the opinion cited by Macris. Three justices 
stated that they did not subscribe to the reasoning of Gray Tool Co. v. Humble Oil and 
Ref. Co., 186 F.2d 365, 367 (5th Cir. 1951), the case cited in the lead opinion. In his 
opinion concurring in the result, in which Justices Russon and Durrant concurred, Justice 
Wilkins stated that the rule under Gray Tool Co. "would be an unnecessarily limiting rule 
of law in my opinion." 2002 UT 21, f^ 16. 
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In any event, Macris wholly failed to produce any admissible evidence in response 
to the motion for summary judgment filed by Neways and the Mowers. Thus, there could 
have been no "competing inferences," since there was no "competing evidence" offered 
in response to the motion for summary judgment. Macris failed to satisfy its burden to 
produce any evidence in support of its claim (on which it had the burden of proof) that 
Images's alleged wrongful conduct made it necessary for this action to be filed. Thus, 
the district court did not improperly weigh any competing inferences. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Neways and the Mowers respectfully request that 
this Court affirm the district court's orders denying Macris's motion to compel and 
granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Neways and the Mowers. 
DATED this 24th day of May 2005. 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
Marx R. Gay lord * rR .  l r  
Craig H. Howe 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES were served on the following this 24A day of May 2005, in the manner set 
forth below: 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No. , return receipt requested 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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DR02, REED & WANGSGARD, LC 
77 West 200 South, Suite 401 
Paul C Dm? Sa i l L a k e C l l y , U t a h 8 4 ] 01 ilnwlow(£)incmmrcx com 
Telephone: (801) 578-3510 
Facsimile: (801)578-3531 
February 1,2001 
VTA FACSIMILE AND CERTIFIED MAIL 
(801)423-7210 
Wade Winegar, Esq. 
150 East 400 North 
Salem. UT 84653 
Re: Macris & Associates. Inc., v. Images & Attitude, Inc., et al. 
Dear Mr. Wincgar: 
1 understand that you are counsel of record for Images & Attitude, Inc., in the above referenced 
maner. Demand is hereby made upoc Images & Attitude, Inc., to satisfy the enclosed Judgment 
entered in this case on September 14, 1995. Wc compute the amount presently due and owing at 
$744,471.77 through today's date, with per diem interest accruing at 5125.68 per day from now 
until paid in accordance with the stated 9.22% judgment interest rale. Our calculations 
supponing the presently due amount of $744,471.77 are set forth on the attached schedule, for 
your reference. 
If we have not received poyment of the full amount due under this judgment by February 
12, 2001, wc will have no choice but to pursue all available methods of collection. We would 
appreciate bearing frpm you promptly. 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
Very truly yours, 
DROZ, REED & WANGSGARD 
Paul C. Droz 
PCD:wh 
Enclosures 
Cc: Macris & Associates, Inc. 
030889 
ftlNCE, YEATES 
I GELOZAHLER 
i Centre I, Suite 900 
'5 East 400 South 
^Satt Lake Crty 
w
 Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
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•HM 0 5 2003 
M. David Eckersley (0956) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NEWAYS, INC., THOMAS E. MOWER, i 
and LESLIE D. MOWER, 
Defendants. j 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANTS* FIRST 
;
 SET OF REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. 950400093 CN 
Judge: Gary D. Stott 
Plaintiff Maoris & Associates, Inc., hereby submits the following responses to 
Defendants' First Set of Requests for Production of Documents as follows: 
REQUEST NO, 1 Produce all documents reflecting attorneys' fees and costs incurred by 
Macris relating to work performed in the Maoris II Action up to and including the date the 
judgment against Images and Attitude, Inc. ("Images") in the Macris I Action was satisfied. 
RESPONSE: See copies provided herewith. EXHIBIT 
ni:18R9 
PFniTFSTNO. 2 Produce all documents reflecting any demand(s) made upon Images, or 
upon any other person or entity, to satisfy the judgment entered against Images in the 
Macris I Action. 
HF.SPONSE: See the letter dated February 1, 2001 from Paul Droz to Wade Winegar, a 
copy of which is submitted herewith. 
PFQ1JFSTNCL_3 Produce all documents that would be required to be produced if this 
case were governed by Rule 26(a)(1) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, effective in 
cases filed on or after November 1, 1999. 
RFSPONSE: Plaintiff is in possession of approximately 15 bankers' boxes of documents 
that were generated in connection with the Macris 1 and Macris II litigation. Defendants 
are free to inspect and copy all such documents at a mutually convenient time between the 
parties. 
DATED this M, day of June, 2003. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By /h.A//*^/^ 
M. David Eckersley c / ^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Centre I, Suite 900 
East 400 South 
ifeaH Lake City 
Utah 84111 
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